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I. INTRODUCTION
[J]ustice is denied when a tortfeasor is permitted to walk away with
impunity because of the happenstance that the unborn child had not yet
reached viability at the time of death. The societal and parental loss is
egregious regardless of the state of fetal development.
-Justice Cleckley'
The recent unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia in Farley v. Sartin2 leads the state into the territory
of fetal nonviability. Farley permits a cause of action for the tortious
death of a fetus from conception until birth.3 Justice Cleckley's opin-
ion expands the law of Baldwin v. Butcher4 from the right of recovery
1. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995).
2. 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
3. Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
4. 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971). Viability is defined as "[t]hat stage of fetal devel-
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for the wrongful death of a viable fetus to the right of recovery for the
wrongful death of an unborn child in any stage of development.' With
the Farley decision, West Virginia joins the absolute minority of states
that do not require viability for civil liability.'
With Farley's expansive interpretation of the definition of a "per-
son" within the context of West Virginia's wrongful death statute, con-
troversy will arise within the arena of tort law, and inconsistencies will
widen among civil liability, criminal liability, and the constitutional
right of a woman to have an abortion. Although the Farley court
stresses that the opinion will not bear on a woman's ability to exercise
her constitutional right to have an abortion, nor crossover into the
criminal context, much speculation and controversy will follow this
case.
7
This Case Comment reviews the jurisprudence of wrongful death
statutes, focusing on a personal representative's right to recover for the
death of a fetus. It examines the facts of Farley and the court's basis
opment when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb
by natural or artificial life-supportive systems." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed.
1990).
5. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia uses the phrase "unbom child" to
encompass all stages of fetal development including conception. The court chose not to use
fetus because it limits the "developmental time frame." Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 523 n.3. This
Case Comment interchanges the use of unborn child and fetus with no explicit difference in
the use of such terms.
6. West Virginia is only the fourth state to adopt a nonviability standard in fetal
wrongful death suits. See also Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996)
(providing for a cause of action for wrongful death of a nonviable child); Shirley v. Bacon,
267 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. 1980) (permitting recovery if an unborn child is "quick" in the
womb); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100, 102 (Ga. 1955) (defining "quick" as "capable of
moving in its mother's womb"); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (en
banc) (permits wrongful death action for unborn child prior to viability). Cf Murphy S.
Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisprudential Inconsistencies in Wrongful Death,
Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933 (1995) (describing the juris-
dictions which adopted a nonviability standard).
7. "[A] wrongful death action will not lie against a woman who chooses to exercise
her constitutional right to have an abortion." Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 535.
The ramifications of this decision on a woman's constitutional right to an abortion,
fetal rights, and criminal liability exceed the scope of this Case Comment. For an explora-
tion into these issues see Klasing, supra note 6 (expounding judicial inconsistencies among
criminal law, constitutional law, and tort law).
[Vol. 98:955
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for discarding the fetal viability requirement in wrongful death actions.
Furthermore, this Comment evaluates the inconsistencies of various
fetal causes of action within West Virginia and provides guidance to
practicing lawyers as to the future impact of the Farley decision in
wrongful death suits.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 6, 1991, the plaintiffs wife, Cynthia Farley, was
killed when her car collided with a tractor trailer.8 The driver and the
owner of the tractor trailer were named as defendants in a wrongful
death action filed by Cynthia Farley's husband, Kenneth Farley.9 The
plaintiffs unborn child was also killed in the accident."
The plaintiff filed the wrongful death action as the Administrator
of the Estate of Baby Farley in accordance with West Virginia Code
Section 55-7-5 which allows for an action for death by wrongful
act." The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant
to Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that
Baby Farley was not viable at the time of death and could not be
considered a "person" under the wrongful death statute. 2 The Circuit
Court of Wayne County granted the summary judgment in favor of the
defendants based on the court's assumption that a fetus between the
age of eighteen and twenty-two weeks of gestation is not viable, and
therefore could not be considered a person. 3 According to the late
wife's treating obstetrician, Baby Farley was approximately eighteen to
8. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 523.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994) (providing:
[w]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would . . . have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action to recover damages, . . . then . . . the per-
son . . . who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an
action for damages).
12. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 524.
13. Id. The Wayne County Circuit Court relied on the requirement of viability es-
poused in the holding of Baldwin v. Butcher. 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971) (discussing
when a fetal wrongful death action would arise).
1996] 957
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twenty-two weeks in fetal development. 4 The doctor "indicated that
the gestational age of Baby Farley was an estimate because more accu-
rate testing is not performed on a normal pregnant woman until her
twentieth week of pregnancy and Mrs. Farley had not reached that
point when calculated from her last menses."' 5 However, the doctor
determined that Baby Farley was neither large enough nor developed
enough to survive outside the mother's womb. 6 Since the fetus was
not viable, the circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's case with preju-
dice."
Mr. Farley appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia asking it to allow a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action
under the wrongful death statute for a nonviable unborn child. 8 The
court found that an unborn child, viable or nonviable, is a "person"
within the context of West Virginia Code Section 55-7-5, and that
"viability is not the appropriate criterion to determine whether an un-
born child is a 'person"' for purposes of the Wrongful Death Stat-
ute. 19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
At common law, no cause of action existed for the wrongful death
of a person.2" If a person died from injuries negligently inflicted upon
him, then the action for such injuries died with him; the action also
died with the tortfeasor.2' Therefore, under the common law, "it was
cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and
14. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 523.
15. Id. at 523 n.2.
16. Id. at 523.
17. Id. at 524. See also Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 436 (allowing a fetal wrongful death
action to be maintained by the personal representative of a viable unborn child).
18. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 524.
19. Id.
20. W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at
945-61 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter, KEETON ET AL.].
21. Id. at 945-61. In England in 1808, Lord Ellenborough held that "in a civil court
the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." Baker v. Bolton, 170
Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
[Vol. 98:955
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that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the
victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy."22
The English Parliament rectified this wrong when it passed the
Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, also known as Lord Campbell's Act. The
Act created a cause of action for wrongful death. Lord Campbell's
Act allowed for "close relatives to recover damages incurred as a result
of the tortious death of the victim."24 Subsequently, every American
state has enacted a statutory remedy for wrongful death.25 West Vir-
ginia adopted a wrongful death action in 1863 patterning it after Lord
Campbell's Act.2 6 The right to bring such a suit is codified in the
West Virginia Code.27 Wrongful death actions are to be brought by
the victim's personal representative for certain designated beneficia-
ries."
A. History of Recovery for Prenatal Torts
Similar to wrongful death, the common law did not recognize a
cause of action for prenatal torts.29 In 1884, Justice Holmes' opinion
22. KEEtON Er AL., supra note 20, § 127, at 945. See also Barbara E. Lingle, Allow-
ing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 ARK.
L. REV. 465, 467 (1991) (explaining the historical background of common law wrongful
death actions).
23. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 525.
24. Gary A. Meadows, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J.
LEGAL MED. 99, 100 n.9 (1992).
25. KETON Er AL., supra note 20, § 127, at 945.
26. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co., 89 S.E.
284, 286 (W. Va. 1916)).
27. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994). See supra note 11 (defining the wrongful death
cause of action).
28. W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (1994). "Every such action shall be brought by and in the
name of the personal representative of such deceased person .... ." W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6
(a) (1994).
29. Michael P. McCready, Recovery for the Wrongful Death of a Fetus, 25 U. RICH.
L. REV. 391 (1991). Two reasons were normally given for denying recovery for prenatal
torts: "first, that the defendant could owe no duty of conduct to a person who was not in
existence at the time of his action; and second, that the difficulty of proving any causal
connection between negligence was too great, such that there was too much danger of ficti-
tious claims." KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, §55, at 367 (footnotes omitted).
1996]
5
Hewitt: Farley v. Sartin: Viability of a Fetus No Longer Required for Wro
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton," the landmark Massachu-
setts case, captured the essence and beliefs of traditional common law
by holding that a fetus is not a "person" for whom suit could be
brought." In Dietrich, a woman who was four to five months preg-
nant slipped and fell on a defective highway. 2 The fall resulted in the
premature birth of the child who died shortly thereafter. 3 In denying
recovery, Justice Holmes reasoned that an unborn child was part of the
mother and that any injury to the child that was not too remote from
the tortfeasor's action was recoverable by the mother herself. 4 Justice
Holmes' approach, that a fetus is part of its mother and not "an inde-
pendent biological entity" is also known as the "single entity" view. 5
For fifty years, American courts followed the single entity view of
Dietrich. However, this view did not come without criticism, mainly
focusing on the medical aspect that a viable fetus could maintain life
outside its mother's womb.36 In 1946, the voice of criticism prevailed
and the District Court for the District of Columbia was the first court
to depart from the Dietrich approach. 7
30. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
31. Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 14-15.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Lingle, supra note 22, at 468-69. See also Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (discussing
the "single entity" approach).
36. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (I11. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Justice Boggs is credited with starting the movement toward the abolishment of disallowing
an unborn child to recover damages in an action. KEMON, ET AL., supra note 20, § 55, at
368 n.13. Justice Boggs argued:
A foetus in the womb of the mother may well be regarded as but a part of the
bowels of the mother during a portion of the period of gestation; but, if, while in
the womb, it reaches that pre-natal age of viability when the destruction of the life
of the mother does not necessarily end its existence also, and when, if separated
prematurely, and by artificial means, from the mother, it would be so far a ma-
tured human being as that it would live and grow, mentally and physically, as
other children generally, it is but to deny a palpable fact to argue that there is but
one life, and that the life of the mother.
Allaire, 56 N.E. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
37. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). See also Lingle, supra note 19,
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In Bonbrest v. Kotz, a father sued on behalf of his infant who had
sustained injuries during delivery.38 The district court allowed the in-
fant to maintain an action and distinguished Bonbrest from Dietrich.
The court reasoned that the infant had survived despite the tortfeasor's
actions; this survival proved that the viable child was a separate being
from its mother.39 The Bonbrest court concluded that a viable infant
could recover for prenatal injuries if the child is subsequently born
alive.4" Other courts rapidly incorporated the Bonbrest holding into the
common law and "brought a rather spectacular reversal of the no-duty
rule."'" As a result of Bonbrest, "every jurisdiction [now] follows the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in allowing a child to recover for prena-
tal injuries as long as the child is born alive."42
After the Bonbrest decision, courts began to expand liability from
the prenatal injury of a fetus who subsequently was born alive to the
wrongful death of an unborn child. The first court to exceed
Bonbrest's scope was the Supreme Court of Minnesota.43 In the land-
mark case, Verkennes v. Corniea,44 the court allowed a father to
maintain a wrongful death suit as the personal representative of his
viable unborn child. In Verkennes, the plaintiff father alleged that the
defendants had failed to properly aid and treat his wife and child in
labor, resulting in the death of both wife and child.45 The court con-
cluded that an action for wrongful death could be maintained when a
life capable of extra-uterine existence was tortiously killed.46
38. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 139.
39. Id. at 140-41.
40. Id. at 142. See also Sheryl A. Symonds, Wrongful Death of the Fetus: Viability is
Not a Viable Distinction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 103, 106-107 (1984) (explaining the
history of recovery for prenatal injury).
41. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 55, at 368. See also Symonds, supra note 40,
at 107 (explaining how United States courts quickly adopted the Bonbrest holding).
42. Klasing, supra note 6, at 935.
43. Verkennes v. Comiea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
44. 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).
45. Id. at 839.
46. Id. at 841. See also Meadows, supra note 24, at 102-103 (discussing the reasoning
behind the Verkennes court's holding).
1996]
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In 1971, West Virginia joined the majority of states by allowing
recovery for the wrongful death of an unborn child.47 In Baldwin v.
Butcher,48 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a
wrongful death action could be maintained by the personal representa-
tive of a viable unborn child for fatal injuries sustained by it while "en
ventre sa mere."49 In Baldwin, the unborn child was injured when his
mother, a passenger in the defendant's vehicle, collided with another
motor vehicle. 0 The child was stillborn, and the plaintiff filed a
wrongful death action as the administrator of his estate." The Circuit
Court of Cabell County dismissed the action concluding that the child
was not a "person" and thus a wrongful death action could not be
maintained. 2 The Baldwin court determined that a viable unborn child
who dies from a defendant's negligence should be considered a person
within the meaning of the wrongful death statute.53 The Baldwin court
reasoned that the nature of the wrongful death act was remedial and
should be liberally construed thereby allowing a wrongful death claim
to be filed on behalf of a viable fetus. 4
B. Standards for Liability in Fetal Wrongful Death Actions
Despite the liberalization of fetal wrongful death suits, American
courts began to diverge on when wrongful death actions involving a
fetus arose.55 In terms of civil liability, various state courts have
adopted different standards ranging from the live birth requirement,56
47. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
48. 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
49. Id. at 436. En ventre sa mere is defined as "[i]n its mothers womb" and is "de-
scriptive of an unborn child." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
50. Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 428-29.
51. Id. at 428.
52. Id. at 429.
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 431.
55. Klasing, supra note 6, at 935.
56. See, e.g., Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Ark. 1995) (holding that the
live birth requirement shall distinguish liability in wrongful death actions); Kalafut v. Gruver,
389 S.E.2d 681, 684 (Va. 1990) (holding that "a tortfeasor who causes harm to an unborn
child is subject to liability to the child, or the child's estate, for the harm to the child, if
the child is born alive"); Pietila v. Crites, 851 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. 1993) (holding that
[Vol. 98:955
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to the viability threshold,57  to the nonviability standard." In
Farley,59 West Virginia moved from the majority, recognizing the via-
bility threshold," to an absolute minority, recognizing and accepting
the standard of nonviability.
1. Live Birth
In a minority of states, the "live birth" requirement permits a suit
to be maintained only for a child who survived a tortfeasor's negli-
gence during or prior to birth.6 This test has been called the most
stringent test for purposes of liability.62 The jurisdictions that have
adopted this threshold have several justifications for the live birth re-
quirement. First, a mother may recover for the death of her unborn
child through damages for her physical injury and mental suffering
associated with the stillbirth; if she also recovered damages as the
administrator of her stillborn child, she would be receiving double
recovery. 3 Furthermore, the live birth creates a bright line test of
liability. Allowing recovery for the unborn may be difficult because
"proof of causation and damages become tenuous .. .."" In live
no wrongful death cause of action arose for the death of a fetus); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248
N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969) (reasoning that the child born alive had to face impaired health
while the deceased fetus did not). See also Klasing, supra note 6, at 936 n.28 (listing other
courts which have adopted the "live birth" requirement).
57. See, e.g., Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1993) (recognizing a cause of
action for a viable unborn child); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc) (holding that the word "person" in the wrongful death statute encompasses a via-
ble fetus); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490 (N.C. 1987) (holding wrongful death
statute to include recovery for the death of a viable but unborn child); Werling v. Sandy,
476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985) (recognizing a wrongful death cause of action for a viable
fetus negligently injured en ventre sa mere and subsequently stillborn). See also McCready,
supra note 29, at 395 (explaining the concept of the viability threshold); Klasing, supra note
6, at 941-49 (discussing those jurisdictions that adopted viability).
58. Klasing, supra note 6, at 949-51; McCready, supra note 29, at 394-95.
59. 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
60. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
61. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946) (first court to recognize such an
action).
62. Klasing, supra note 6, at 935-36.
63. McCready, supra note 29, at 398, 402.
64. Id. at 402.
1996]
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birth jurisdictions, even if the child dies shortly after birth an action
can be maintained because the requirement of life has been met.65
Despite these justifications, the live birth requirement has been
criticized for embodying a lack of understanding about fetal develop-
ment.66 The rule assumes that a fetus cannot be considered a person,
able to survive outside the womb, at any point prior to birth.67 The
live birth rule is also criticized for being unjust because it "protects the
tortfeasor rather than the victim since it rewards lethal tortious conduct
by allowing recovery only if the child in the womb survives." 8 Such
harshness can be illustrated by the following often used twin analogy.
Suppose a woman pregnant with twins and due to a tortfeasor's negli-
gence one was stillborn and one was born alive dying shortly after the
birth. In a live birth jurisdiction, the mother could not maintain an
action for the stillbirth's death, but she could file a wrongful death suit
for the death of the child born alive.69 Due to the strictness of this
rule, a majority of jurisdictions have rejected or abolished the live birth
requirement in wrongful death actions and adopted the rule of "viabili-
ty.,,7
2. Viability
Although a majority of jurisdictions permit fetal wrongful death
actions, most require a viable fetus to fulfill the definition of a "per-
son" in wrongful death statutes. 71 The fetus is considered viable when
it can live indefinitely outside the mother's womb.72 The viability
concept was first suggested by Justice Boggs of the Illinois Supreme
Court in his dissent to Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital.73 Justice Boggs
65. Id. at 395 n.44.
66. Lingle, supra note 22, at 468 nn.19 to 20.
67. Id.
68. Klasing, supra note 6, at 940.
69. See McCready, supra note 29, at 403. See also Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 435 (ana-
lyzing the twin analogy).
70. Lingle, supra note 22, at 468.
71. Meadows, supra note 24, at 106.
72. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1565-66 (6th ed. 1990).
73. 56 N.E. 638 (Ill. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 98:955
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argued that when an unborn child is viable it must be considered an
independent and separate life and not merely part of the mother's
body.74 The once progressive reasoning of the Allaire dissent is now
the cornerstone of many states' viability standard.75 A second reason
for adopting the viability rule is that it allows for consistent results
between those children born dead and those children born alive who
die a short time afterward.76
Although less stringent than the live birth requirement, the viability
threshold also has not come without criticism. The main criticism sur-
rounds the difficulty in proving at what point in the pregnancy a child
is viable.77 The point of viability varies with each child, as well as
advances in modem medicine which can accelerate viability.78 The
viability standard also has been criticized as an arbitrary cutoff for
deciding when to allow recovery in a fetal wrongful death suit.79
3. Nonviability
With the realization that viability has no bright line of demarca-
tion, some courts have embarked upon the idea that a fetus is a person
in terms of wrongful death statutes at the time of conception." In the
jurisdictions that have adopted a nonviability standard, a tortfeasor will
be held liable for the wrongful death of an unborn child from the time
of its conception until birth.8" Arguments for adopting a nonviability
standard range from legislative construction of a "person" within the
74. Id. at 641.
75. See, e.g., Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 722 (Ariz. 1985) (en
bane) (recognizing that the "ability of the fetus to sustain life independently of the mother's
body that should determine when tort law should recognize it as a 'person' whose loss is
compensable to survivors"); Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 432 (W. Va. 1971) (holding that a via-
ble fetus is an individual capable of independent life and capable of sustaining a legal
wrong, thereby holding it to be a "person" within the wrongful death statute).
76. McCready, supra note 29, at 403.
77. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960).
78. Meadows, supra note 24, at 107.
79. Symonds, supra note 40, at 115.
80. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d
100, 103 (Ga. 1955) (holding that a fetus is a person at the time of "quickness" which is
after the time of conception but prior to the point of viability).
81. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
1996]
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wrongful death statute82 to the remedial nature of the act.3 Further-
more, valid arguments have been set forth stating that the nonviability
standard would cure the arbitrariness of the viability and live birth
requirements.84 However, most states faced with the decision of adopt-
ing nonviability for fetal wrongful death actions have rejected the re-
quirement."
A 1995 decision by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that reject-
ed nonviability is representative of other courts that have ruled similar-
ly.86 In Kandel v. White, the court held that a nonviable fetus was
not capable of maintaining a claim for wrongful death.88 Despite the
plaintiffs' argument that liability should not depend on the arbitrary
distinction of viability, the court found that viability was a "condition
precedent" to maintaining a cause of action on behalf of a stillborn
fetus.8 9 There could be no liability because the fetus could not main-
tain a separate and independent existence from its mother.9" Further-
more, the court reasoned that a line had to be drawn at viability be-
cause of the need to have "boundaries to the zone of liability."'" The
82. Conner v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (holding that a nonviable
unborn child was a "person" for purposes of the wrongful death act).
83. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995); Porter v. Lassiter 87 S.E.2d 100
(Ga. 1955).
84. Symonds, supra note 40, at 115. Generally, most jurisdictions have abandoned the
viability and live birth "line-drawings" and have opted for the conception threshold for re-
covery for "children who are injured prenatally, but born alive." Id.
85. See, e.g., Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D. Alaska 1962) (rejecting recov-
ery where a nonviable unborn child was delivered dead); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134,
137 (N.H. 1980) (holding that "no independent cause of action for wrongful death lies on
behalf of a nonviable fetus that never achieves live birth"); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d
1032, 1037 (Kan. 1990) (noting that "viability is not an illogical condition precedent when a
negligently injured fetus is stillborn" because it "has never become an independent living
person"); Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67, 69 (R.I. 1991) (holding that a
nonviable fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of Rhode Island's wrongful death act);
Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608, 610 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting a cause of action for wrong-
ful death of a nonviable fetus).
86. Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995).
87. 663 A.2d 1264 (Md. 1995).
88. Id. at 1266-67.
89. Id. at 1267.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1269 (quoting Wallace, 421 A.2d at 136).
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court declined to go beyond the "zone of liability" established by pre-
cedent unless the legislature expressly directed the court to include a
nonviable aborted fetus within the scope of the wrongful death stat-
utes.92 Finally, the Kandel court noted that the adoption of the
nonviability concept would cause an inherent conflict between a
woman's constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy and her right
to recover wrongful death damages on behalf of a nonviable fetus.93
IV. THE DECISION
In Farley, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's unan-
imous landmark decision permitted the personal representative of a
nonviable fetus to maintain a wrongful death suit.94 The Farley opin-
ion reviewed the history of fetal wrongful death actions and modified
the West Virginia wrongful death statute to include a nonviable fetus
as a "person."95 This expansive interpretation of the statute places
West Virginia in the minority of states willing to define a fetus as a
person from conception until birth.96
After a thorough explanation of the facts and procedural history of
the case,97 the Farley court addressed the standard of review for the
question presented.9" The court reviewed the entry of summary judg-
92. Kandel, 663 A.2d at 1269. In Wallace, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
succinctly expressed its refusal to maintain an action for a nonviable fetus:
The real question is not when life begins but rather, whether our death of a fetus
that has not drawn a breath of air, seen the light of day, or possessed the capacity
to survive in the world outside its mother, despite all the medical and other care
that could be mustered for it. To deny nonviable fetus a cause of action is not
deny that life begins with conception. It is simply a policy determination that the
law will not extend civil liability by giving a nonviable fetus a cause of action for
negligence before it becomes a person, in the real and usual sense of the word, by
being born alive. In other words, life may begin with conception but causes of
action do not.
Wallace, 421 A.2d at 136-37 (emphasis added).
93. Kandel, 663 A.2d at 1267-68.
94. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
95. Id. at 522-32.
96. Id. at 532-33.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 8-19.
98. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 524.
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ment de novo and recognized the issue of viability as the appropriate
standard within the wrongful death context as a question of law.99 As
part of its review, the Farley court devoted substantial discourse to the
progression from the traditional common law rule, that no cause of
action could survive the tortfeasor or the victim, to the criticism of the
single entity view,' 0 to the modem courts' acceptance of fetal
wrongful death suits.' ' In particular, the court focused on the growth
and development of prenatal torts and fetal wrongful death actions.' 2
Furthermore, the Farley court analyzed the standards of liability for
those jurisdictions which allow recovery for the wrongful death of an
unborn child.'0 3
After reviewing the history, the court preceded its analysis of the
issue presented with a sua sponte discussion of a living child's right to
sue for previable injuries suffered by him en ventre sa mere.' 4 The
Farley court decided that viability at the time of injury was a "mere
99. Id. See Painter v. Peavey, 451 S.E.2d 755 (W. Va. 1994); State ex rel. McGraw
v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, 461 S.E.2d 516, 522 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that questions
of law are subjected to de novo review).
100. See Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638 (I11. 1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Justice Boggs is "credited with starting the movement to abolish the theory that a tortfeasor
owes no duty to an unborn child because the child 'was not in existence at the time of
[the] action . . . .' Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (citations omitted).
Justice Boggs also argued that precedents were used in common law to "illustrate
principles, and to give them a fixed certainty." It would be absurd not to change precedent
when time and education have proved the common law incorrect Id. (quoting Allaire, 56
N.E. at 640 (Boggs, J., dissenting)).
101. See Verkennes v. Comiea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (allowing a father to
maintain a wrongful death suit as the personal representative of his viable unborn child). See
supra text accompanying notes 29-54.
102. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526-27. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
103. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526-32. Even though some jurisdictions do not allow a fetal
wrongful death action to be maintained, most states do allow for some recovery depending
on the status of the child when it died. See supra text accompanying notes 55-93.
Jurisdictions that denied recovery for tortious death of a viable unborn child claimed
various reasons: (1) The lack of precedents and strict adherence to stare decisis; (2) the
common law belief of the mother and child as a single entity; (3) belief that allowing fetal
wrongful death actions would lead to fraudulent claims and difficulties in proof of causation
and damages; and (4) the argument that the legislature should determine such issues. Farley,
466 S.E.2d at 531-32. The Farley court diffused each of these arguments in their own right.
Id.
104. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 532-33.
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theoretical abstraction."1 °5 Thus, the court concluded that a tortiously
injured nonviable child who subsequently is born alive has the same
right to compensation that a viable fetus with tortious injuries would
receive if subsequently born alive."0 6 The court then turned to the is-
sue of whether a cause of action should lie for the tortious death of a
nonviable unborn child. 7
The court began its analysis of this key issue by reviewing the
"dearth of precedent" which denied a fetal wrongful death action to a
nonviable child, and determined that the reasons for denial were not
persuasive enough to "infuse the [viability] distinction into West Vir-
ginia statute." ' The court reasoned that stare decisis was insufficient
to deny a wrongful death suit for a nonviable fetus, noting that "land-
mark decisions become landmark because they establish new,
groundbreaking precedent."' 9 Furthermore, the court concluded that
forsaking the majority position for the lesser known rule of
nonviability, would not cause harm to any West Virginia interest.'
Rather, this rule would only broaden the class of litigants allowed to
file suits under the West Virginia wrongful death enactment.1 ' More-
over, the Farley court reasoned that viability jurisdictions allow the
tortfeasor to avoid liability for the full extent of damages caused by
his negligence, thereby denying justice.' The court reasoned that the
societal and parental loss of an unborn child at any stage is deplorable,
and parents should be compensated for their loss."'
In making its decision, the Farley court relied heavily on the dis-
sent of Justice Maddox in the Alabama case of Gentry v. Gilmore."4
Justice Maddox believed that the phrase "minor child" in Alabama's
105. Id. at 532 (citations omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 532-33.
108. Id. at 533.
109. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533 n.23.




114. 613 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ala. 1993) (Maddox, J., dissenting).
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wrongful death statue should include a nonviable unborn child." 5 In-
clusion of this standard would:
(1) promote the purpose of the wrongful death statute, which is to prevent
the wrongful termination of life, even potential life; (2) facilitate the
legislature's intent to protect nonviable fetal life, as expressed in other
statutes concerning abortion and fetal deaths; and (3) be logically consis-
tent with prior decisions of this Court that have . . rejected . . . artificial
distinctions based on viability and live births as conditions for recov-
ery.
6
The Farley court believed that the "artificial" distinction of viability
focuses on the status of life that's been wrongfully terminated, rather
than upon the tortfeasor's conduct." 7 Furthermore, the Farley court
contended that the loss of a potential family member to tortious con-
duct should equal the loss of an existing member." 8 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals reasoned that these "common-sense
principles" set forth in Justice Maddox's dissent serve the purpose and
goals of the wrongful death statute: to provide economic compensation
for bereaved families of the victim.'
The court further justified its holding by reasoning that West
Virginia's Wrongful Death Act should be interpreted liberally to meet
the remedial goals and purposes of the enactment. 2 ' Defining the
term "person" to include a nonviable child for wrongful death purposes
would not be inconsistent with past interpretation because West Virgin-
ia courts have always construed the statute liberally.'
Anticipating criticism to this expansive interpretation of a "person,"
the court responded to the argument that the nonviability rule created
115. Id. at 1245 (Maddox, J., dissenting).
116. Id.
117. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
118. Id. The court concedes the "degree of bonding and love toward an unborn child
may not be as great that which would extend toward the deceased in the more typical
wrongful death case." Id. at 534 n.25. However, this fact does not go to the actionability
but rather to the question of damages. Id.
119. Id
120. Id. at 534. See Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 431 (explaining that the policy of the
statute is remedial and not punitive).
121. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
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the potential for fraudulent claims and increased difficulties in proof of
causation and damages."' The court rebutted this contention arguing
that even if the rule increased those risks, this reason alone should not
bar claims.12 By denying recovery for all nonviable fetuses, the
courts would be rejecting valid as well as fraudulent claims." 4 The
court rationalized that the nonviability standard removed the trial
court's difficult task of determining viability.1 5 The Farley court also
conceded that interpretation of the statute should fall within the realm
of the legislature's duties, and invited the legislature to focus attention
on this matter.1"6 However, in the legislature's failure to act, the
court reasoned that it had a duty to reach decisions which are most
consistent with the nature and goals of the wrongful death statute.2 7
Throughout the decision the court stressed that the definition of a
"person" within the gamut of the wrongful death statute would not
extend into issues of abortion or the area of criminal law.2 8 The
Farley court dismissed the issue of abortion when it stated "[t]he abor-
tion question simply is not relevant to wrongful death.' 21, 9 Moreover,
"if a woman has a constitutional right to decide whether to carry an
unborn child to term or abort it, then the act of aborting is not tor-
tious.""'3 The court also concluded that the nonviability standard in





126. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 535 n.29. See also State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson, 332 S.E.2d 807 (W.
Va. 1984) (recognizing no criminal liability for the killing of a viable unborn child).
129. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534. In making this determination, the court relied heavily
on law review articles which concluded that the different policies governing abortion and
wrongful death decisions would lead to inconsistencies when defining a "person." Id. See
also Symonds, supra note 40, at 113 (explaining that defining a "person" consistently
throughout all areas of the law would not serve the purposes and goals underlying each
jurisprudential area).
130. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 535.
131. Id. at 535 n.29.
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In summary, the court held that if a nonviable fetus dies as a
result of a person's tortious conduct, the personal representative of the
deceased may file a wrongful death suit.' Furthermore, the court, in
dictum, reasoned that a nonviable unborn child who is tortiously in-
jured, but is subsequently born alive will be able to maintain an action
for damages against the tortfeasor.'33
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF FARLEY
In West Virginia, the Farley decision has simplified the fetal cause
of action for wrongful death by erasing the arbitrary distinctions be-
tween viability and nonviability. Thus, a person may be liable for all
tortious conduct toward any unborn child. The adoption of the
nonviability rule will not come without cost or controversy. Speculation
and debate are almost certain to arise concerning: the various defini-
tions of when a fetus is a person; the ever-widening zone of liability
for tortfeasors; the evidentiary difficulties which will arise from the
Farley holding; and the Supreme Court of Appeal's seeming disregard
for the doctrine of stare decisis.
In West Virginia, the definition of a "person" vary according to
the area of the law. The definition for purposes of criminal liability
was defined in State ex rel. Atkinson.'34 The Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of West Virginia denied the state the right to prosecute for the
murder of an unborn, viable child. 35 The Atkinson court reasoned
that the legislature had the primary right to define crimes and their
punishments. 36 Thus, if the court decided that a person could be con-
victed for the killing of an unborn viable fetus, then it would exceed
its power and encroach upon the right of the legislature to create new
crimes.'37 Instead of adopting the proposed new rule of viability, the
132. Id. at 535.
133. Id at 532-33.
134. 332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984).
135. Id. at 808.
136. Id. at 810.
137. Id. In his dissent, Justice McGraw criticized the majority's reliance on a distinction
of the court's role in tort law versus criminal law. Id. at 812 (McGraw, J., dissenting). The
majority hinged its ruling on the fact that wrongful death decisions have been creatures of
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18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/13
VLABILITY NO LONGER REQUIRED
court decided to adhere to the archaic common law rule of live
birth. 8 When the Atkinson court did not expand the criminal law
definition of a "person" to include a viable unborn child, an inconsis-
tency in state jurisprudence was created between the definition of a
person under the wrongful death statute'39 and the criminal law defi-
nition of a person. As Justice McGraw pointed out in his dissent in
Atkinson, by adhering to the live birth rule it has become easier "to
collect but not convict" for the killing of an unborn child.'
Concerning the issue of criminal liability, the Farley court ex-
plained that the definition of a "person" for purposes of criminal liabil-
ity would be unaffected by its decision.' Under the Farley rule, a
nonviable or a viable fetus is a "person" within the tort context, how-
ever the individual who killed that same fetus runs no risk of criminal
conviction." 2 This rule further exacerbates the conflicting standards
which depend upon the context in which the suit is filed.
Adding to this complexity is a woman's constitutional right to
have an abortion. In Roe v. Wade,'43 the United States Supreme
Court legalized abortion. At issue in Roe was whether or not the fetus
is a "person" in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.'44 The Roe
holding established a trimester framework to help determine when the
state can regulate abortion. 5 Roe suggests that "once a fetus reaches
viability" the life of a person begins. 6 In 1992, the Roe ruling was
common law. Id. at 810. However, Justice McGraw correctly noted that actions for wrongful
death have always existed by creation of statute. Id. at 812 (McGraw, J., dissenting). In
fact, the common law recognized no action for wrongful deaths. Id. at 812 (McGraw, J.,
dissenting).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70.
139. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
140. Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 812 (McGraw, J., dissenting).
141. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 535 n.29.
142. Id. See also Klasing, supra note 6, at 959-62 (discussing the different interpreta-
tions of a "person" in terms of wrongful death and the criminal liability).
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
144. Klasing, supra note 6, at 966.
145. Id. at 966-67. Note that "after viability the state may regulate abortion only as it
'reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health."' Id. at 967-68
(footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 967.
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modified when -the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey"'
rejected the rigid trimester framework of Roe and concluded that "the
line should be drawn at viability" for purposes of abortion.'48 There-
fore, before the date of viability a woman has the right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy which has been interpreted as the point when
a fetus becomes a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1
49
Although the Farley court has explained that a woman who aborts
her nonviable child will not be held liable under the wrongful death
statute because the "act of aborting is not tortious,"'50 there is an "in-
herent conflict in giving the mother the right to terminate the pregnan-
cy yet holding that an action may be brought on behalf of the same
fetus under the wrongful death act.' 1 Furthermore, the president of
West Virginians For Life, a pro-life activist group, has heralded this
decision as "a recognition of the court that unborn children have civil
rights.' 52
After the Farley court's adoption of nonviability in the wrongful
death context, West Virginia is left with three separate definitions of a
"person." Under the wrongful death statute, a "person" is defined to
include a fetus ftom conception until birth.'53 Under the criminal ho-
micide statute, a "person" does not include any type of fetus, rather
when a child is born it is considered a "person" for purposes of crimi-
nal liability.'54 Finally, according to the Fourteenth Amendment which
governs the constitutional right to have an abortion, a fetus becomes a
"person" at the point of viability.'55
147. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
148. Id. at 2816.
149. Id.
150. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534-35.
151. Klasing, supra note 6, at 966 (citations omitted).
152. Nancy Nussbaum, Father Can Sue for Death of Wife's Fetus in Crash, High Court
Rules, CHARLESTON GAzE-IE & DAILY MAIL, Dec. 14, 1995, at PIA.
153. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 535.
154. State ex rel. Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 812.
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With the court's decision to make conception the threshold of
liability in the wrongful death context, efforts may soon begin to "wid-
en more and more the circle of liability which surrounds us.' 5 6 In
Wallace v. Wallace,'57 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire denied
a wrongful death action for a nonviable fetus recognizing that with
every enlargement of the "zone of liability," tenacity builds a new and
wider zone. 5 The Wallace court stated that "[i]f life is not to be-
come intolerable, there must be some boundaries to the zone of liabili-
ty. Neither logic nor science is the determining factor. It is the policy
of the law which must establish a reasonable limitation on liabili-
ty."'59 The Wallace court avoided determining when life begins, rea-
soning that although life may begin at conception, the cause of action
does not necessarily begin at that time. 6
Eradicating the viability distinction for purposes of liability may
send the court on a "slippery slope" toward extending the zone of
liability beyond the range of nonviable fetuses into the stage of precon-
ception. 6' Although the Farley court argues that the wrongful death
act is remedial in nature and needs to be liberally interpreted, 62 the
court seems to cast aside arguments that "viability is not an illogical
condition precedent .... A nonviable fetus is not capable of living
outside its mother's womb; it cannot maintain a separate and distinct
existence. Thus, a nonviable fetus which dies before birth has never
become an independent living person."' 63 The court argued that the
societal and parental loss is no less egregious for an eighteen week old
fetus than a fetus of nine months.'64 Yet, the emotional loss of a
nonviable unborn child does not negate its physical inability to live an
independent and distinct existence outside of its mother womb.
156. Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134, 136 (N.H. 1980).
157. 421 A.2d 134.
158. Id. at 136.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 137.
161. Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H. 1980).
162. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 531 (citing City of Wheeling ex rel. Carter v. American
Casualty Co., 48 S.E.2d 404, 408 (W. Va. 1948)).
163. Miccolis v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 587 A.2d 67, 70 (1991) (quoting Humes v.
Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Kan. 1990)).
164. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533.
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In the Farley opinion, the court averred that the nonviability stan-
dard eliminated the "need for the trial court to decide what often could
be an extremely difficult factual question, i.e. whether the fetus was
'viable. '" 65 With the adoption of a nonviability standard, the court
recognized that increased difficulties would arise when determining
factual issues such as the "moment of conception" and calculation of
damages. 166 However, it reasoned that such issues were not justifica-
tion to bar a nonviable fetal wrongful death claim. 7 Furthermore,
the court did not offer any guidance on how to resolve such factual
questions. In essence, the Farley court eradicated the difficult eviden-
tiary issue of the point of viability and created potentially difficult
questions of when conception occurred and how to calculate damages.
Finally, there may be criticism of the court's seeming disregard of
the doctrine of stare decisis.' 68 The court justified its departure from
precedent stating that often precedent must change to accommodate
modem technology, skill and experience not known beforehand.6 9
However, even with modem technology and medicine, a fetus within
the first twenty-two weeks cannot survive outside the womb of its
mother. 7 ° Capability to live a separate and distinct existence is the
character and quality that the majority of courts have used to distin-
guish a fetus from a person. 7'
VI. CONCLUSION
With the Farley decision, tort victims can claim victory, but like
all victories, it comes with a price. The Farley court rejected the via-
bility standard in the fetal wrongful death context and adopted one of
165. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Stare decisis is defined as the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and not to
disturb settled point." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
169. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 527.
170. Id. at 524. The plaintiff's doctor testified that "[tihe earliest surviving infant that
[he] knew of was right at 500 grams, which would have been about 22 weeks." Id.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
[Vol. 98:955
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss3/13
VIABILITY NO LONGER REQUIRED
nonviability. As a result of the Farley decision, a person's life and his
wrongful death causes of actions begin at conception."'
With the adoption of this rule, an inconsistency now exists be-
tween the realms of constitutional law and civil liability. Moreover, the
Farley decision only widens the conflict between criminal law and
wrongful death liability. Whether the decision will have a problematic
effect among these three areas of the law remains to be seen, but, in
terms of civil liability, the Farley court purports to have answered the
question so many courts consider unanswerable of when life begins.
The unanimous decision also indicates how far the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia is willing to interpret the wrongful death
statute for tort victims; this holding can only encourage victims to
appeal undesirable results to the Supreme Court of Appeals in hopes of
changing the wrongful death law for a more favorable outcome. The
Farley decision most likely will not end questions concerning the duty
for tortfeasors, but rather more difficult questions are sure to arise as
to the foreseeability of the tortfeasor's conduct toward a nonviable
fetus which may be far more difficult to answer than the viability
issue.
Robin C. Hewitt
172. See supra text accompanying notes 94-133.
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